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I. Introduction 
The external debt problem of African countries is now recognized as a serious 
global economic issue.1 A number of papers on the subject, including studies by 
Humphreys and Underwood (1988), Mistry (1988), the United Nations (1988), 
Helleiner (1989), Greene (1989) and Lancaster (1989), have appeared during the 
past year.2 In addition, the G-7 countries have acknowledged the gravity of the 
problem through their decision at the June 1988 Toronto Summit, and the annual 
meetings of the International Monetary Fund (Fund) and the World Bank in 
September 1988, to provide more extensive debt relief for very-low-income 
countries. In March 1989, the United States government also signalled changes 
in its own approach to debt relief, as evidenced by the recent Brady proposals 
for reducing external debt to commercial banks. Whether these proposals might 
extend to official debt is of particular interest to African countries since at the 
end of 1987, 71 percent of their publicly-guaranteed medium- and long-term 
external debt was owed to official creditors, compared to only 21 percent to 
financial institutions (Table la and b). 3 
The severity of the African debt problem can be seen from the data that 
appear in Tables 1—3 and Figure 1. These figures abstract from the significant 
differences among the debt positions of individual countries, in particular the 
success of a few countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe in restraining their 
debt accumulation and in meeting their debt-service obligations without need for 
rescheduling. Nevertheless, the figures point to a sharp rise in aggregate debt 
during the past two decades.4 From an estimated US$8 billion in 1970, the total 
external debt of African countries (excluding arrears) has risen to an estimated 
US$174 billion at end-1987, including short-term debt estimated at US$12 
billion (Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2). Measured in constant (1980) US dollars, 
total African debt at the end of 1987 was nearly seven and a half times its level 
in 1970. Total debt-service payments by African countries are estimated to have 
grown from less than US$1 billion in 1970 to nearly US$18 billion in 1987, net 
of arrears and debt relief. As a ratio of exports of goods and services, Africa's 
debt service payments have risen from an estimated 8 percent in 1970 to 33 
percent in 1987 (Table 2), again net of rescheduling and arrears. Total debt 
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Figure 1 Aggregate external debt of Africa, 1970—1987 (billions of US dollars) 
Figure 2 Aggregate external debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970—1 987 (billions of US dollars) 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 986 1987 
1970 1975 1980 1982 985 986 1987 
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ratios have also risen sharply over this period. The ratio of total 
external debt to GDP has increased from an estimated 16 percent at 
the end of 1970 to 70 percent at the end of 1987. As a proportion of 
exports of goods and services, total debt has risen from an estimated 
73 percent at the end of 1970 to 322 percent at the end of 1987. 
During the period 1980—1987, real GDP per capita of African 
countries declined by about 8 percent (Table 3). 
Table 1 a ExternaJ debt and debt service of At ricaa and Sub-Saharan At rica,b 1970—i 987 
(billions of US dollars; at end of period) 
I. Africa 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1986 1987 
(est.) (est.) 
Aggregate external debt 
by type of creditor 8.2 23.5 84.2 104.8 133.0 153.8 174.0 
Medium and long-term debt mci. Fund 8.0 22.5 75.1 91.6 120.5 142.3 162.2 
Medium and long-term debt excl. Fund 8.0 22.0 72.8 86.7 113.3 134.7 153.8 
Publicly guaranteed 
To official creditors 
To private creditors 
Not publicly guaranteed 
Fund 
Short-term debt 
Debt service payments 
7.6 21.1 69.4 81.5 106.8 127.3 145.9 
(5.2) (12.4) (35.9) (48.0) (69.3) (86.2) (101.7) 
(2.3) (8.7) (33.5) (33.5) (37.5) (41.1) (44.2) 
0.4 0.9 3.4 5.2 6.5 7.4 7.9 
— 0.5 2.3 4.9 7.2 7.6 8.4 
0.2 1.0 9.1 13.2 12.5 11.5 11.8 
0.9 2.7 12.4 15.0 19.0 18.0 17.9 
To non-Fund agencies 0.9 2.6 11.6 14.3 17.7 16.1 15.8 
Interest payments (0.4) (1.1) (5.1) (6.1) (7.5) (6.2) (6.4) 
Amortization (excl. short-term debt) (0.5) (1.6) (6.5) (8.1) (10.2) (9.8) (9.4) 
To the FundC — 0.1 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.1 
Memorandum items 
Estimated impact of rescheduling — — 
Estimated stock of arrears — 0.5 
Percentage of publicly guaranteed 
debts owed to: 
Governments 55.3 43.1 
Multilateral institutions, mci. Fund 13.2 17.1 
Financial institutions 5.3 22.7 
Other creditors 25.0 17.1 
0.8 0.5 4.2 12.9 12.9 
0.6 5.8 14.5 17.2 18.4 
35.6 39.4 42.9 45.4 46.0 
12.7 21.9 24.2 24.1 25.3 
35.3 30.1 24.1 22.8 21.0 
11.6 8.7 8.8 7.6 7.7 
continued next page... 
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Table lb 
II. Sub-Saharan At rIca 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1986 1987 
(est.) (est.) 
Aggregate external debt 
by type of creditor 
Medium and long-term debt, 
mci. Fund 
Medium and long-term debt, 
excl. Fund 
Publicly guaranteed 
To official creditors 
To private creditors 
Not publicly guaranteed 
Fund 
Short-term debt 
6.0 15.8 54.0 73.1 
5.8 15.2 47.9 63.6 
5.8 14.7 45.1 58.5 
5.4 13.8 41.8 53.6 
(3.8) (9.4) (26.9) (36.6) 
(1.6) (4.4) (15.0) (17.0) 
0.4 0.8 3.2 5.0 
— 0.5 2.8 5.1 
0.2 0.6 6.1 9.5 
97.2 112.7 126.5 
87.6 105.3 119.2 
80.8 98.9 113.3 
74.7 92.3 106.4 
(53.8) (69.0) (81.2) 
(20.8) (23.2) (25.1) 
6.1 6.6 6.9 
6.9 6.4 5.9 
9.6 7.4 7.3 
Debt service payments 
To non-Fund agencies 
Interest payments 
Amortization (excl. short- 
term debt) 
To the FundC 
0.7 2.1 6.4 8.1 
0.7 2.0 6.0 7.5 
(0.3) (0.8) (2.8) (3.6) 
(0.4) (1.2) (3.1) (3.9) 
— 0.1 0.5 0.6 
12.2 9.9 9.2 
11.2 8.5 7.9 
(5.2) (3.6) (3.7) 
(6.0) (4.9) (4.2) 
1.0 1.4 1.3 
Memorandum items 
Estimated impact of rescheduling — — 0.8 0.5 
Estimated stock of arrears — 0.5 0.6 5.6 
Percentage of publicly 
guaranteed debt owed to: 
Governments 53.7 46.9 40.4 41.9 
Multilateral institutions, irici. Fund 16.7 22.4 26.2 29.0 
Financial institutions 5.6 17.5 26.2 23.0 
Other creditors 22.2 14.0 7.4 6.0 
3.1 11.1 11.1 
14.3 16.6 18.0 
44.9 48.8 49.2 
29.5 27.7 28.4 
17.4 16.7 15.3 
8.2 6.8 7.0 
Sources: International Monetary Fund 1988; and International Rnancial Statistics. 
a. Defined as Africa excl. Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. 
b. Defined as Africa exci. Algeria, Angola, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa and Tunisia. 
c. Repurchases and charges; excludes payments on Trust Fund and SAF loans. 
The debt and output trends for Sub-Saharan Africa5 point to an even more 
dramatic increase in external debt burdens. Aggregate debt (excluding arrears) is 
estimated to have risen from US$6 billion in 1970 to US$126 billion at the end 
of 1987, including short-term debt of US$7 billion. In constant (1980) US dollar 
terms, the increase was about 620 percent. 
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Table 2 Debt burden indicators for Sub-Saharan Africa and debt distressed countries (%) 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1986 1987 
(est.) (est.) 
Ratio of external debt to exports of goods and services 
Africa 72.6 71.2 108.7 180.4 230.4 315.0 321.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 65.4 65.2 94.1 190.9 253.6 335.5 352.4 
Countries with recent debt-servicing 
problemsa 131.7 111.0 155.6 247.0 282.3 322.6 317.0 
Fifteen heavily-indebted countriesb 162.5 133.9 169.5 271.9 301 .2 361.0 347.6 
Ratio of external debt to GDP 
Africa 15.9 19.5 31.9 41.4 50.3 58.1 70.0 
Sub-SaharanAfrica 14.1 17.1 27.2 38.7 51.2 62.8 81.6 
Countries with recentdebt-servicing 
problemsa 18.7 18.8 34.2 44.6 51.1 51.7 54.2 
Fifteen heavily-indebted countriesb 19.6 18.5 33.1 43.0 47.8 49.2 51.3 
Ratio of debt service payments to exports of goods and servicesc 
Africa 7.8 8.4 15.9 25.5 32.6 36.9 33.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.7 8.2 11.1 23.2 31.8 29.5 25.6 
Countries with recent debt servicing 
problemsa 19.4 20.8 27.8 33.7 35.8 39.1 32.6 
Fifteen heavily-indebted countriesb 24.8 27.7 30.0 40.4 40.3 46.4 38.3 
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1988. 
a. Average for capital-importing countries that experienced external arrears in 1985 or that resched- 
uled debt during 1984—1986. 
b. Average for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'lvoire, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Peru, Phillipines, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. 
c. Data for 1970 and 1975 exclude payments to the Fund. 
Total debt service payments have risen from an estimated US$1 billion in 
1970 to US$9 billion in 1987, with the latter figure being less than the estimated 
total of arrears and debt relief during the year. Real GDP per capita, by compari- 
son, is estimated to have fallen by over 11 percent over the same period. As a 
percentage of exports of goods and services, Sub-Saharan Africa's debt-service 
payments have risen from an estimated 8 percent in 1970 to 26 percent in 1987, 
again net of rescheduling and arrears. The region's debt ratios have also risen 
sharply over this period. The ratio of total external debt to GDP has increased 
from an estimated 14 percent at the end of 1970 to 82 percent at the end of 1987. 
Relative to exports of goods and services, total debt has risen from an estimated 
65 percent at the end of 1970 to 352 percent at the end of 1987. In 1987, the re- 
gion's ratios for debt to exports and debt to GDP exceeded those for the 15 
heavily-indebted countries, and for the group of countries with recent debt-ser- 
vicing problems,6 while the debt-service ratio was smaller, mostly because ar- 
rears and debt relief reduced payments to less than half of all scheduled obliga- 
tions. Thus, it seems fair to call Sub-Saharan Africa a debt-distressed region, 
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even though a few Sub-Saharan countries, such as Botswana and Zimbabwe, 
have succeeded in meeting their external debt-servicing obligations. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the causes of the debt crisis (Section 
II), as well as its consequences for African economies (Section III). Various poi- 
icy options that have been proposed in the literature to address the debt issue are 
considered in Section IV. An analysis of what countries might do in the future 
once the debt problems are resolved is contained in Section V. The final part of 
the paper (Section VI), summarizes the arguments made and contains some brief 
suggestions for additional research. 
II. Causes of the crisis 
A variety of factors can be seen as having led to the African debt crisis. High 
among these is overborrowing. Most developing countries, including those in 
Africa, face a shortage of capital, and there is a strong presumption that foreign 
savings can and should be utilized to augment the stock of capital over and 
above what could be provided by domestic saving. This presumption implies 
that the typical developing country should be a net foreign borrower. The addi- 
tion to the stock of external debt over time must contribute to growth and devel- 
opment, and in particular to the country's ability to make payments to creditors. 
This is the fundamental relationship underlying the notion of "sustainability" of 
the stock of foreign debt. 
The issue, in other words, is not whether a developing country should borrow 
abroad, but how much it should borrow. For this, theory offers some insights— 
and an understanding as to how the overborrowing occurred. The analytical 
framework of the "growth-with-debt" literature, for example, provides a way of 
determining debt capacity and optimal foreign borrowing.7 The standard model 
used for this purpose contains two building blocks. The first of these is a growth 
relationship in which domestic real output is assumed to depend on factors of 
production, such as capital, labour, and imported inputs, and on total factor pro- 
ductivity.8 For simplicity, one can make domestic output (q) a function only of 
the domestic capital stock:9 
(1) q=f(k) 
where f k is the marginal product of = f k> 0 
Real national income (y) is the difference between real output and interest 
payments on foreign debt: 
(2) y=q-rD 
where r is the foreign interest rate and D is the stock of external debt. 
Combining equations (1) and (2), and differentiating with respect to time we 
obtain: 
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(3) 
where a dot over a variable denotes a time derivative. 
The second building block of the model is the savings relationship. Total sav- 
ings (S) is made up of private savings (Sp), government savings (Sg), and for- 
eign savings (SO: 
(4) S=Sp+Sg+Sf 
Private savings can be specified as a function of disposable income: 
(5) Sp=s(l—t)y 
where s is the average propensity to save, and t is the average tax rate on in- 
come. 
Government savings is the fiscal balance, that is revenues (which in this 
model comprise only income tax revenues—ty) minus government expenditures 
on goods and services (G): 
(6) Sg=ty—G 
Finally, foreign savings is equal to the current account balance (net foreign 
borrowing): 
(7) Sf=D 
In equilbrium, savings (S) will equal investment (k), so by substituting (5), (6), 
and (7) into the identity (4) we obtain: 
(8) k=S=[s(l -t)+t]y-G+13 
Converting equation (3) into growth rates and substituting for k from (8) 
yields: 
(9) 
Equation (9) yields the basic propositions associated with the growth-with-debt 
literature. These are the following: 
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(a) A country can increase its growth of real national income by foreign bor- 
rowing so long as the marginal product of capital (fk) exceeds the cost of 
foreign borrowing (r). Within this simple framework, the optimal level of 
foreign borrowing would be up to the point where fk = r. 
(b) An increase in private saving—through an increase in the average propen- 
sity to save—would raise the growth rate. 
(c) An increase in the fiscal deficit, brought about either by a decline in tax 
revenues or an increase in government expenditures, would have an ad- 
verse effect on growth. 
(d) A rise in the foreign interest rate would lower the growth rate (by the value 
of the debt-to-income ratio), as would a decline in external financing (13). 
It is clear from the discussion in the Introduction that a large majority of 
African countries have not been able to generate a sufficient increase in output, 
and in particular export earnings, to be able to meet their debt obligations. In 
other words, ex post the countries can be regarded as having overborrowed. 
Many factors—domestic and external—are responsible for this outcome. From 
the time of independence, Sub-Saharan African countries have undertaken pub- 
lic projects with heavy use of foreign financing. Many of these development 
projects were designed to create and expand the industrial base and social infras- 
tructure, thereby allowing an increase in national income and exports. In retro- 
spect, however, the assumptions underlying a foreign-financed development 
strategy proved to be incorrect for several reasons. 
First and foremost, the terms of trade shifted against African countries (Table 
3). In the early 1970s, following the first round of oil-price increases in 1973, 
prices for a number of commodities (cocoa, coffee, sugar, tea, groundnuts, sisal, 
phosphate and uranium) rose sharply.lO Many of the countries that benefited 
from these price developments responded by sharply expanding public 
expenditure. Revenues from commodity taxation, though higher, did not rise as 
fast, and governments used foreign borrowing to meet the remaining costs of 
particular spending projects. When commodity prices subsequently fell, 
expenditures were not reduced commensurately, and governments resorted to 
additional borrowing to maintain expenditure levels. This policy would have 
been appropriate had the decline in the terms of trade been temporary, but the 
deterioration of the terms of trade persisted through the 1980s. By 1987, the 
terms of trade for Sub-Saharan countries (excluding Nigeria) were 24 percent 
below the 1980 level (Table 3), 11 and export earnings in dollar terms remained 
approximately the same. 
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Table 3 Selected economic indicators for Africaa and Sub-Saharan Africa,b 1970— 
1987 
1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1986 1987 
(est.) (est.) 
(Index: 1980 = 100) 
Africa 
ReaIGDP 67.7 86.2 100.0 103.0 106.7 109.3 111.7 
RealGDPpercapita 90.0 99.8 100.0 97.4 93.3 92.8 92.1 
Consumer prices 25.3 42.4 100.0 138.4 232.4 265.8 307.5 
Export value 13.7 40.3 100.0 73.4 74.0 59.0 63.9 
Export volume 95.6 95.6 100.0 80.7 94.8 100.6 98.1 
Importvolume 50.0 77.7 100.0 105.4 89.2 77.8 71.0 
Export unit value 14.3 42.2 100.0 91.0 78.1 58.7 65.1 
lmportunitvalue 29.5 61.8 100.0 90.6 82.6 93.7 102.7 
Termsof trade 48.6 68.3 100.0 100.4 94.5 62.6 63.4 
Non-oil commodity prices 36.4 60.5 100.0 76.1 77.3 79.8 77.8 
Gross capital formationC 19.2 26.7 23.3 21.4 16.9 18.8 18.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
ReaIGDP 72.4 90.7 100.0 101.5 101.7 104.6 107.1 
RealGDPpercapita 97.0 105.8 100.0 96.1 89.1 89.2 88.8 
Consumerprices 21.5 38.1 100.0 144.1 266.8 308.8 369.4 
Exportvalue 15.2 41.1 100.0 64.6 66.6 55.6 58.4 
Export volume 94.9 97.6 100.0 70.4 81.4 85.8 82.9 
lmportvolume 55.5 75.8 100.0 101.0 80.1 71.3 66.6 
Exportunitvalue 16.1 42.1 100.0 91.6 81.9 64.8 70.4 
Importunitvalue 28.3 59.7 100.0 91.3 83.4 94.7 104.0 
Terms of trade 56.8 70.6 100.0 100.3 98.2 68.4 67.7 
Non-oil commodity prices 37.2 54.7 100.0 75.1 77.9 80.5 78.7 
Gross capital formationc 19.2 23.8 20.0 17.2 11.6 13.5 13.0 
Sub-Saha ran Africa, exci. Nigeria 
ReaIGDP 75.4 88.9 100.0 104.7 108.4 112.2 114.8 
Real GDP per capita 100.0 103.0 100.0 98.9 94.2 94.8 94.3 
Consumerprices 19.7 33.6 100.0 154.8 291.0 359.7 452.3 
Export value 26.6 50.9 100.0 83.9 86.4 87.7 90.1 
Exportvolume 91.2 97.0 100.0 100.6 107.6 115.7 115.8 
Import volume 76.8 85.0 100.0 95.8 87.2 84.4 83.4 
Export unit value 29.2 52.5 100.0 83.4 80.3 75.8 77.8 
lmportunitvalue 27.0 58.3 100.0 91.4 83.2 93.8 102.4 
Termsof trade 108.2 90.0 100.0 91.2 96.6 80.8 76.0 
Non-oilcommodityprices 37.7 55.0 100.0 75.4 77.6 80.8 78.9 
Grosscapitalformationc 21.7 22.9 19.8 19.0 17.0 17.7 17.6 
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1988. 
a. Defined as Africa excluding Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. 
b. Defined as Africa excluding Algeria, Angola, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, and Tunisia. 
c. As a percent of GDP. 
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Another factor that contributed to Sub-Saharan debt burdens during the 1 980s 
was the rise in foreign interest rates. Although less important than for market 
borrowers, because of the predominantly official character of Sub-Saharan debt, 
rising interest rates nonetheless affected a number of countries that had made 
significant use of commercial borrowing.12 According to Kmmm (1985), higher 
real interest rates may have increased debt levels for Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, and 
Zambia by more than 10 percent during the period 1979—1 983. 
The decline in net capital inflows, including external assistance, in the 1980s 
was yet another factor that affected the ability of Sub-Saharan countries to meet 
debt-service obligations. Combined net external borrowing and non-debt-creat- 
ing flows, including estimated debt relief and arrears, rose from US$6 billion in 
1975 to US$17 billion in 1982, before falling to US$8 billion in 1985. Total in- 
flows recovered to US$13—14 billion in 1986 and 1987, but this was largely due 
to debt relief, estimated at US$1 1 billion during each of these years. Excluding 
debt relief and arrears, it is estimated that net capital flows fell from US$1 1—13 
billion a year during 1980—1982 to less than US$1 billion a year during 1986— 
1987. 
While external factors have contributed to the debt problems of Sub-Saharan 
countries, domestic policies also bear a considerable part of the blame. As noted 
earlier, many countries opted for major development programmes and highly 
expansionary fiscal policies during the commodity boom years of the 1970s, ac- 
quiring external debt as spending increases outpaced the rise in tax receipts. 
These spending policies continued for some time after the post-1980 collapse in 
commodity prices. A few countries also used external borrowing to maintain 
consumption in the face of falling export earnings. The growing fiscal deficits 
also reduced the ability of governments to make debt-service payments as they 
led to declines in the growth of national income, inflationary pressures, and 
overvaluation of exchange rates. Private savings, which could have been an a!- 
ternative to foreign borrowing, were also discouraged by policies designed to 
keep domestic interest rates low. This resulted frequently in negative real inter- 
est rates and disintermediation in the financial sector. 
ID. Consequences of the 
African debt crisis 
General consequences 
The debt situation that has arisen from the factors just discussed has had a se- 
vere impact on African economies, exacerbating the problems arising from the 
sharp deterioration in primary commodity prices during 1 986—i 988. With export 
earnings having fallen during 1986—1987 to only US$43 billion, about 36 per- 
cent below the nominal level for 1980, steadily rising debt-service obligations 
have sharply constrained Africa's import capacity. By 1987, real imports by 
African countries were 29 percent below the level of 1980. The decline in capi- 
tal-goods and intermediate imports has, in turn, had serious repercussions for the 
ability of African countries to finance and undertake development projects. 
Gross capital formation in African countries fell from 23 percent of GDP in 
1980 to 19 percent in 1987. Accordingly, the growth rate of real GDP has aver- 
aged only 1.8 percent a year during 1980—1987, a full percentage point lower 
than the average annual rate of population increase. By 1987, real GDP per 
capita was 8 percent below that of 1980. Adjusted for the decline in the terms of 
trade, Africa's fall in GDP was even sharper, implying a much larger decline in 
living standards. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa, the effects of the debt crisis have, if anything, been 
more pronounced. As of 1987, real imports were only two-thirds their 1980 
level, reflecting the impact of higher debt-service obligations and export earn- 
ings only marginally above their 1977 levels. Between 1980 and 1987 gross 
capital formation fell from 20 to 13 percent of GDP. Real GDP per capita 
dropped by 11 percent during this period. To some extent these figures reflect 
the impact of the 1986—1987 oil-price decline on Nigeria, the largest of the Sub- 
Saharan countries. Excluding Nigeria, real imports in 1987 were 17 percent be- 
low their 1980 level, while 1987 exports in nominal US dollars were 10 percent 
below their 1980 level. Nevertheless, real GDP per capita was 6 percent lower in 
1987 than in 1980, reflecting declines both in gross capital formation and gross 
domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. 
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Besides causing a decline in living standards, the accumulation of a substan- 
tial debt overhang has imposed tight constraints on economic policy. In many 
African countries, policy-making has deteriorated to a state of constant crisis 
management. Maintenance programmes relying on imported goods have been 
slashed to curb overall government expenditure, and longer-term issues, such as 
the need for addressing deteriorating social services or improving education 
programmes, cannot be addressed. Increasing amounts of time have instead been 
devoted to successive debt reschedulings and short-term adjustment pro- 
grammes, many of which depend crucially on the vagaries of international pri- 
mary commodity markets. In general, the continuity of macroeconomic policies, 
which is an essential condition for the undertaking of structural reforms, has had 
to be sacrificed in order to cope with the pressures of the debt and debt servic- 
ing. 
The debt build-up and the resulting squeeze on external resources have also 
been destructive to economic institutions. With foreign exchange resources 
stretched to the limit, arrears on debt-service and external commercial payments 
have become commonplace. This has impaired the credit worthiness of many 
countries, and the number of domestic and foreign firms willing to invest or do 
business in African countries has plummeted. Foreign direct investment, which 
was never very large to start with, is now negligible, and future prospects are 
even worse. The scarcity of foreign exchange has also driven firms and individ- 
uals in many countries to import consumer goods, spare parts, and production 
inputs at high local prices through parallel markets, where the rate of exchange 
is often a multiple of the official exchange rate. Flourishing parallel markets 
have, in turn, encouraged the smuggling of exports, particularly where official 
exchange rates have not been adjusted in line with developments in parallel 
markets. At the same time, the effects of rising fiscal deficits and monetary ex- 
pansion have contributed to rampant inflation in many countries, undermining 
savings incentives and making African countries even more reliant on foreign 
funds to finance investment projects. Rapid increases in import prices have also 
led to a diversion of investment funds from productive projects to the stockpil- 
ing of imports in some countries. In addition, expectations of large changes in 
producer prices have disrupted the steady flow of agricultural products to offi- 
cial export agencies, sometimes reducing export earnings as countries cannot 
meet export quotas or take advantage of temporary increases in world commod- 
ity prices. 
Effects on future debt-servicing capacity and import levels 
Africa's debt burdens also have important repercussions for the region's future 
debt-servicing capacity and for its ability to increase real imports. These impli- 
cations can be seen with the help of balance of payments projections.13 
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Projections are made for exports, service credits and debits (including external 
interest payments), grants and private transfers, and the various elements of the 
capital account: direct investment, disbursements of medium- and long-term 
loans, loan principal payments, and short-term capital movements. Available fi- 
nancing, including reserve movements, official flows, and any debt relief, less 
planned reductions in any external arrears, is then calculated, which by defini- 
tion equals the overall balance of payments. The difference between overall bal- 
ance and the sum of the various current and capital account items described 
above indicates the amount of imports, consistent with the rest of the balance of 
payments in any particular year. Applying an appropriate world price deflator 
will convert the import figures into a set of real import levels. The consistency 
of these figures with overall growth targets can then be examined by calculating 
the yearly percentage changes in the projected real import levels. 
By changing the levels of debt and debt service, one can estimate the impact 
of the debt build-up and of various debt-relief schemes on Africa's external 
position. Different import paths will emerge, depending on how the resulting 
savings in debt service are allocated among additional imports, and increase in 
reserves, and arrears reduction. The difference between these import paths and 
the baseline projection of imports will provide one measure of the impact of 
debt accumulation. In addition, by assuming a given rate of import-volume 
growth, the required change in debt-service obligations can be estimated. This 
change can, in turn, be compared to existing projections of debt relief or trans- 
lated into a required reduction in the projected stock of external debt. 
Tables 4 and 5, which draw on the World Economic Outlook (October 1988) 
projections for African countries up to 199014 illustrate how a debt-impact exer- 
cise can be performed. The main elements of the balance of payments for this 
group of countries are presented in Table 4, with the resulting trends of total 
debt-service payments, the total debt stock, and real import levels shown as 
memorandum items. In Table 5, alternative import paths are derived, using sev- 
eral assumptions regarding changes in the debt stock and the availability of debt 
relief. In addition, the amounts of debt relief and changes in export earnings 
needed to obtain a growth in real imports of 5 percent a year are estimated, 15 on 
the assumption that additional export earnings or savings in debt service are all 
used to increase imports. 
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Table 4 Africa: Hypothetical medium-term 
1990 (billions of US dollars) 





Direct investment, net 
M and L/T liability, net 
SIT liability, net 
Asset transactions, net 
Errors and omissions 




Use of Fund credit, net 
Liab. Const. for auth. reserves 
Exceptional financing 
Of which: Debt reschedulinga 
Arrearsa 
Memorandum items 
Total debt-service paymentsb 






















































Source: International Monetary Fund, 1988, and estimates. 
a. Figures reported here represent debt rescheduling and arrears granted during individual years and 
therefore differ from totals for arrears and cumulative impact of debt relief shown in Table 1. 
b. Figures reported for 1986 and 1987 are based on Tables 1 and 3. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
(est.) (proj.) (proj.) 
Current account -12.7 -8.4 
Trade balance -2.8 0.3 
Exports (40.0) (43.5) 
Imports (-42.7) (-43.2) 
Service balance -17.2 -16.5 
Credits (8.7) (10.0) 




























Index of real imports (1980=lOO)b 77.8 
Percentage changeb -12.8 
17.9 18.7 20.6 20.8 
174.0 184.6 194.5 209.1 
71.0 70.9 72.6 74.6 
-8.7 0.1 2.4 2.8 
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Table 5 Africa: Effect on import capacity of alternative debt and debt-reduction 
proposals 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
(Index: 1980 = 100) 
Import volume 
Baseline projection 77.7 70.8 70.9 72.6 74.6 
Halving of bilateral debt in 1989 and 1990 77.7 70.8 70.9 79.7 81.7 
Five percent volume growth in 1989 and 1990 77.7 70.8 70.9 74.4 78.2 
(billions of US dollars) 
Import value 
Baseline projection 42.7 43.2 45.6 48.1 51.3 
Halving of bilateral debt in 1989 and 1990 42.7 43.2 45.6 52.8 56.4 
Difference from baseline — — — (4.7) (5.1) 
Five percent volume growth in 1989 and 1990 42.7 43.2 45.6 49.6 54.0 
Difference from baseline — — — (1.5) (2.7) 
Memorandum items 
Bilateral official debt 63.7 73.7 77.0 82.4 89.1 
Debt service payments 18.0 17.9 18.7 20.6 20.8 
Estimated debt reliefa 10.6 8.6 3.0 15.5 11.6 
Exports 40.0 43.5 42.8 47.0 50.2 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, 1988, and estimates. 
a. Figures reported here represent debt relief and arrears granted during individual years and there- 
fore differ from totals for arrears and cumulative impact of debt relief shown in Table 1. 
Table 5 indicates the differences in available imports from several conceiv- 
able debt-relief and debt-reduction proposals. On the assumption that the as- 
sumed overall maturity (17 years) and average interest rates (5.5 percent) for 
African debt remain unchanged, a halving of Africa's official bilateral debt 
stock now projected at the end of 1989 and the end of 1990 would allow addi- 
tional imports in 1989 and 1990 of US$4.7 billion and US$5.1 billion, respec- 
tively, assuming no further repercussions and no difference in the currently ex- 
pected arrears or reserves paths. These figures are equivalent to real import 
levels that are 9.8 and 9.5 percent higher, respectively, in 1989 and 1990, than 
the baseline projections for these years. Table 5 also indicates that to allow for 
an increase in real imports of 5 percent each year from the previous year's level, 
debt-service payments would have to be lower by US$1.5 billion in 1989 and 
US$2.7 billion in 1990, or export earnings larger by the same amounts. This is 
equivalent to requiring an additional 3 percent rise in the value of export earn- 
ings or a 10 percent increase in anticipated debt relief in 1989, and increases of 
5 percent in exports or 23 percent in anticipated debt relief in 1990. 
The exercise undertaken here can be applied in principle to any individual 
country or group of countries. Likewise, other debt proposals can be simulated, 
to show their effects on debt-saving payments and the level of financeable im- 
ports. Alternatively, the amount of debt relief or debt reduction needed to 
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achieve a targeted rate of import growth over a particular period can be calcu- 
lated for any given projection of export earnings and capital inflows. The pro- 
jections for export earnings and capital inflows can also be varied to show their 
impact on the financeable level of imports, as well as combinations of import 
growth, capital inflows, and debt relief consistent with desired import levels. 
IV. Policy options to address 
the debt overhang 
Given Africa's difficulty in achieving even a minimal level of real import 
growth while meeting its debt-servicing requirements, action is needed if 
African countries are to be able to attain the levels of real import growth needed 
to prevent further decreases in real GDP per capita. Apart from increases in ex- 
ternal capital flows, a variety of debt-related policy options have been sug- 
gested. This section provides a brief summary of the most significant of the pro- 
posals that have been advanced, classified by the type of creditor to which debt 
is owed.16 
Debt to bilateral creditors 
To date, most of the attention on debt relief relevant to African countries has fo- 
cused on debt owed to bilateral official creditors—governments and export 
credit agencies, primarily of industrial countries. At the end of 1987 this repre- 
sented about 46 percent of Africa's medium- and long-term debt and 49 percent 
of the debt for Sub-Saharan countries. The debt proposal adopted at the Toronto 
summit in May 1988 dealt, for example, with bilateral official debt. Under this 
proposal, bilateral creditors agreeing to debt relief for low-income countries 
would choose among three types of relief to provide on debt which is resched- 
uled through the Paris Club: (1) forgiveness of one-third of the debt service due, 
with the remainder rescheduled over a period of 14 years, with 8 years' grace; 
(2) rescheduling all eligible obligations over a 14-year period, including 8 years' 
grace, at interest rates 3.5 percent below market or, when market rates are less 
than 7 percent, half the market rate; and (3) rescheduling of all obligations at 
market rates, over a period of 25 years, including 14 years' grace. 
One option that has been suggested by Helleiner (1989), as an extension of 
the Toronto measure, is for bilateral lenders to forgive outright large portions of 
their debt to low-income countries.17 This could be considered an extension of 
UNCTAD Resolution 165 (S-IX) of March 1978 that called for waiving the debt 
service on past official development assistance lending (or extending new grants 
to cover it) to the lowest-income countries and for future assistance to come in 
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the form of grants.18 A number of countries, particularly the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Scandinavian nations, have already forgiven significant portions 
of the African loan portfolios.19 Several arguments are made in favour of further 
loan forgiveness. One is that bilateral governments do not rely heavily on re- 
flows from past development loans to fund new assistance activities, and that the 
amounts involved are relatively small. Another is that debt forgiveness would 
relieve African countries of the heavy administrative and financial costs associ- 
ated with the need for repeated debt rescheduling under the Paris Club. Under 
the present system, countries unable to meet their debt-service obligations must 
apply each year for debt relief. Compiling the necessary information for the 
Paris Club is both difficult and time consuming, and some countries find it diffi- 
cult to obtain the foreign resources needed to meet the moratorium interest due 
on the rescheduled debt.2° 
Proposals for additional debt forgiveness carry certain risks, however. 
Creditors offering it would need to be clear that the relief was provided only to a 
well-defined group of countries, most likely low-income countries for which 
debt-service ratios exceeded some very high level such as 25 percent of exports 
of goods and services. It would also be important that the forgiveness be limited 
to countries pursuing appropriate economic adjustment programmes, so as to en- 
sure that debt forgiveness was accompanied by efforts to restructure their 
economies and make them less dependent on foreign assistance. To provide re- 
lief for export credit, which represents a major share of bilateral African debt, 
budgetary support would be needed to replenish the capital of certain export 
credits agencies, such as the United States' Ex-Im Bank, whose operations are 
largely self-funding.2' Finally, in some countries debt reduction might be seen 
as tantamount to a budgetary transfer and be used to offset an equivalent amount 
of new aid. For this reason some creditors might find it easier to approve for- 
giveness of the debt service due on certain African debt than to forgive the debt 
itself. 
Debt to multilateral agencies 
Another set of proposals has been suggested for relieving debt service due to 
multilateral agencies like the Fund and the World Bank, which at the end of 
1987 accounted for about 25 percent of Africa's medium- and long-term exter- 
nal debt and about 28 percent of the same for Sub-Saharan Africa.22 This cate- 
gory of debt represents a considerably larger fraction of Africa's actual debt- 
service payments because these agencies do not by convention offer debt 
rescheduling. This practice reflects the preferred status of multilateral agencies 
as creditors and the reliance of many agencies on the recycling of their capital to 
fund new activities. Debt relief or cancellation could not only threaten that sta- 
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tus, but also require a reduction in their ability to undertake new operations 
without hard-to-obtain capital increases. 
One proposal suggested for alleviating the debt-service obligations of African 
countries to multilateral agencies, is for bilateral donors to provide funds in the 
context of a Paris Club rescheduling for low-income countries to meet up-corn- 
ing obligations to these agencies. Another is to provide the agencies with funds 
to offer debt relief directly to low-income countries undertaking suitable ad- 
justment programmes. A third option is to establish a separate agency to absorb 
past loans, and perhaps extend Fund credit, to provide the existing agencies with 
a "clean slate" for making new loans to low-income countries. Each of these 
proposals has its own advantages and disadvantages, which are discussed at 
length in Greene (1989). 
Apart from issues of principle, a major problem with all of these proposals is 
the difficulty of envisioning the financing that would make them operational. 
During the last several years, payments by Sub-Saharan countries, for example, 
to multilateral agencies have been estimated at roughly US$3 billion a year, a 
not inconsiderable fraction of the bilateral loan disbursements (US$2 billion) 
and grants (perhaps a comparable sum) these countries have received each year. 
To cover any significant fraction of their obligations due to multilateral agencies 
would require either a major diversion or significant expansion of the bilateral 
assistance now provided to these countries. Under the present budgetary condi- 
tions facing most bilateral creditors, it seems doubtful whether this type of sup- 
port would be forthcoming. 
Debt to commercial banks 
Debt to commercial banks and other financial institutions represents a relatively 
small share of Africa's medium and long-term debt: about 21 percent at the end 
of 1987, and only 15 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, a 
African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia 
have significant amounts of commercial-bank debt outstanding. In addition, 
these and other African countries have requested or obtained debt relief from the 
London Club. 
Numerous proposals for relief or reduction on external debt due to commer- 
cial banks have been offered, because of their relevance to middle-income 
countries, and analyses of their advantages and disadvantages have been pre- 
sented elsewhere.23 Of the various proposals, suggestions for debt-buybacks 
have been among those most frequently mentioned, and plans to this effect have 
been considered for Mozambique and the Rebuplic of the Congo. Measures to 
exchange old debt for new securities may be less realistic in the case of African 
countries because many private lenders may not be prepared to increase their 
present exposure to Africa. The US plan for debt reduction may well have an 
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impact on the debt problems of those African countries that have significant 
amounts of commercial debt. 
Debt to other private creditors and commercial arrears 
A number of African countries have amassed significant external debts to pri- 
vate suppliers, and some have a substantial backlog of unpaid commercial and 
personal obligations. Some of these suppliers' credits may in fact have been as- 
sumed by export credit guarantee agencies and would therefore be extinguished 
under programmes to reschedule or forgive official bilateral debt. Nevertheless, 
proposals for clearing unguaranteed commercial payments arrears would benefit 
a number of African countries and go a long way towards restoring their com- 
mercial viability with suppliers and potential outside investors.24 Whether donor 
countries would provide the necessary funds for arrears clearance is uncertain. 
To have maximum impact, any proposals for clearing African external arrears 
should be coupled with reforms of country trade-and-payment systems aimed at 
easing the externalization of capital income, wages, and pension earnings. This 
might be hard to achieve, however, in view of the severe foreign exchange con- 
straints on many African countries and the difficulty in avoiding restrictions on 
payments for current transactions. 
V. Looking beyond the 
debt overhang 
Whether or not policies are adopted to alleviate Africa's debt overhang, mea- 
sures will be needed to deal with the current constraints on Africa's import ca- 
pacity and expansion of output. This requires, in the first instance, the creation 
of a favourable climate for investment to produce the growth rates needed to 
raise per capita incomes and living standards. Structural reforms aimed at mod- 
ernizing investment codes, reducing restrictions on establishing new firms, 
eliminating price controls, and developing financial facilities are all central for 
raising the level and efficiency of investment. Equally important for investors 
(domestic and foreign), are macroeconomic stability and credibility of govern- 
ment policies. In the absence of incentives for private investment, it is unlikely 
that growth will revive sufficiently to compensate for a decade of economic 
losses. 
To support the increase in needed investment would normally require a mix 
of additional foreign financing and increases in domestic savings. In so far as 
foreign financing is concerned, the prospects of large-scale inflows, as discussed 
in Section IV, do not appear very bright. Furthermore, it can be argued that ad- 
ditional foreign borrowing that would raise debt levels further is not even desir- 
able. Certainly this would be the case for increases in non-concessional debt, as 
this type of borrowing carries relatively high interest rates and often short re- 
payment periods. But the argument applies equally to concessional borrowing. 
Previous concessional borrowing for development projects represents much of 
the African debt now being rescheduled, and high rates of moratorium interest 
are being charged on the export credits frequently associated with these projects. 
Obviously, avoiding all foreign borrowing is unrealistic, since most multilateral 
agencies can only finance projects through loans. Care should be taken, how- 
ever, to limit concessional borrowing to projects likely to yield foreign exchange 
earnings commensurate with the up-coming debt-servicing costs. Such an ap- 
proach could be a useful component of an overall development strategy aimed at 
bolstering export earnings and promoting efficient import substitution. It could 
also attract support from bilateral donors, many of whom have provided an in- 
creasing share of their aid to low-income African countries in the form of grants 
during recent years. 
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Domestic savings will naturally have to take up the slack in foreign financing. 
The strengthening of domestic savings will require measures to increase both 
private- and public-sector savings. 
Increasing private savings, for most African countries, will require a signifi- 
cant reform of current financial policies aimed at making it more attractive for 
individuals and firms to accumulate financial assets. Among other things, this is 
likely to require an increase in nominal interest rates, so that interest rates ap- 
proach or become positive in real terms. It may also require some expansion of 
savings vehicles and an increase in banking facilities in currently under-served 
areas. At the same time, however, most African countries will need to devote 
serious attention to reducing inflation and creating the type of environment con- 
ducive to amassing private savings. In many African countries inflation rates are 
so high that, in the absence of very large increases in nominal rates, consumers 
find it attractive to consume, or acquire real assets, and merchants are encour- 
aged to stockpile consumer goods as a hedge against inflation. Without moderat- 
ing the rate of inflation, it is hard to see how these disincentives to savings can 
be overcome, particularly in view of the strong political resistance to increasing 
interest rates observed in many African countries. 
As for public savings, the key to any increase must be a reduction in fiscal 
deficits. Boosting public savings requires a willingness to increase government 
revenues, reduce expenditures, and decrease the losses of public enterprises. 
Each of these steps is likely to be politically difficult. Achieving higher revenues 
may require significant revisions in tax laws and in revenue administration and 
enforcement, while expenditure cuts may require tighter systems for monitoring 
government expenditure. In addition, governments will need to be willing to 
limit certain popular types of programmes, such as subsidy payments and mili- 
tary outlays, in order to preserve funds for programmes more closely related to 
increasing economic growth. These include expenditures for efficient capital 
projects, for maintenance of existing capital projects, for certain education and 
health programmes, and for materials and equipment required for the productiv- 
ity of the civil service. In some countries, it will be important to preserve and 
augment staff salaries. In others, reductions in the number and the size of salary 
increases for civil servants may be needed. 
VI. Conclusions 
There is no longer any disagreement or doubt that African countries generally, 
and those in Sub-Saharan African in particular, face a serious and growing ex- 
ternal debt problem. External debt as a ratio to GDP or to exports of goods and 
services has risen more than three-fold since 1980, and in the case of Sub- 
Saharan Africa now exceeds the comparable ratios for other developing coun- 
tries with debt-servicing problems, such as the heavily indebted countries in 
Latin America. During the past five years, more than half the Sub-Saharan 
countries have incurred arrears on debt-service obligations or sought debt 
rescheduling. In 1987, without debt relief, scheduled debt-service obligations 
would probably have exceeded 50 percent of exports of goods and services. 
The African debt crisis cannot be attributed to a single cause. Many factors 
were responsible. Some were external, such as the deterioration in the terms of 
trade, the rise in foreign interest rates, and the fall in external financing. 
However, inappropriate domestic policies—growing fiscal deficits, rapid mone- 
tary expansion, and maintenance of overvalued exchange rates—also played a 
significant role in the build-up of the debt and the inability to service it. The 
theoretical presumption that these factors would exert a negative effect on the 
ability to repay on time appears to be supported by developments in Sub- 
Saharan countries in the past decade. 
The consequences of the debt crisis have been quite severe for the African 
economies. Growth rates, investment rates, and exports have all fallen sharply 
since 1980. Real per capita GNP has declined steadily by about 1 percent a year 
during this period. The existing debt burden is proving to be a significant obsta- 
cle to the development efforts of governments in Africa. Furthermore, the debt 
has seriously constrained the scope of macroeconomic policy-making, and has 
had damaging effects on economic and financial institutions. Economic policy- 
making in many African countries has been reduced to crisis management, with 
longer-term strategies being shelved in order to meet the day-to-day needs of 
foreign exchange, to make debt-service payments and acquire necessary imports 
for production and consumption. 
This paper has considered several proposals for debt relief that have been 
made in the literature on African debt. These relate to debt to bilateral creditors, 
to multilateral institutions, to commercial banks, and to other private creditors. 
Unfortunately, at this stage there is considerable uncertainty about any of these 
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being implemented, since they require financial resources that neither the donor 
countries, nor the multilateral institutions, are ready or able to provide. But 
clearly, there is a real and pressing need for a comprehensive solution to the 
African debt problem. Without such a solution it is difficult to see an end to the 
underlying problems of poverty and stagnation that are crippling many, if not 
most, African countries. 
This paper has taken a broad look at the African debt crisis. There is a need 
for more in-depth research and analysis of debt problems of individual African 
countries. Each country has its own pattern of debt and debt service. In addition, 
solutions are likely to be tailored to each country's individual circumstances, 
particularly proposals for debt relief or reduction formulated in the context of 
economic adjustment programmes. It is incumbent on researchers in individual 
countries to improve their knowledge of present and forthcoming debt burdens 
and to develop blueprints for meaningful adjustment programmes. Creditor 
countries have indicated their willingness to assist African countries in respond- 
ing to their debt problems. Events during the past year have indicated clearly, 
however, that such assistance will be available only to those countries willing to 
adjust their own economies in the direction of improved external viability. 
Notes 
1. Throughout this paper the term African countries is used to denote the 47 IMP 
member countries in Africa excluding South Africa. Of the various African coun- 
tries, only Angola and Namibia, in addition to South Africa, are not included. 
2. Earlier studies on the subject include Krumm, 1985, and Lancaster and 
Williamson, 1986. 
3. The remaining 8 percent was owed to other private creditors. 
4. The data prior to 1980 must be treated with some caution. 
5. This is defined as Africa excluding South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Morocco, 
Namibia, and Tunisia. 
6. These countries are defined as capital-importing developing countries that in- 
curred external payments arrears in 1985 or that rescheduled their debt at any time 
during 1984—1986. See International Monetary Fund, 1988, p. 54. 
7. See McDonald, 1982, for a survey of this literature. An explicit derivation of the 
basic model is contained in a recent paper by Hernandez-Cata, 1988. 
8. This is basically the neoclassical form of the growth model. See Khan and 
Montiel, 1989. 
9. Expanding the model to take the role of other factors into account, as well as the 
effects of total factor productivity, does not significantly alter the results. 
10. SeeKrumm, 1985. 
11. If Nigeria is included, the decline in the terms of trade was 33 percent. 
12. These include Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
13. The following analysis follows the approach used in Stymne, 1988, to calculate 
trade-offs among import levels, debt reduction, and export earnings for Sub- 
Saharan Africa. 
14. See International Monetary Fund, 1988. 
15. This 5 percent annual growth rate for real imports was chosen arbitrarily. 
16. For a discussion of various proposals advanced for debt relief, see Helleiner, 
1989, and Lancaster, 1989. 
17. A similar proposal has also been made by Mistry, 1988, and endorsed by 
Lancaster, 1989. 
18. See United Nations, 1988, par. 67, p. 24. 
19. In early July of this year, the United States announced its intention to forgive a 
significant portion of its ODA debt from low-income African countries that were 
implementing adjustment programmes. 
20. See Helleiner, 1989. 
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21. See Lancaster, 1989, for a discussion of this issue. 
22. Among those making these proposals are Mistry, 1988, and Helleiner, 1989. See 
also the papers in Lancaster and Williamson, 1986. 
23. See, for example, Corden, 1988, and Dooley, 1988. 
24. These proposals have been made by Lancaster, 1989. 
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